![]() Is an independently existing reality with which our beliefs and statements may 160, he defines “metaphysical realism” as: “.the view that there His argument here is worthy of serious study because it is so bad: “ aesthetic appreciation.” Of course, these views might not assign much importance to epistemicĪs a general thesis about reality, metaphysical idealism is seriously deficientĬourse, has to be the worst thing one can be according to him). ![]() “independent” world (if there is such): one might maintain that the proper “pragmatism” when one considers the possible relationships between us and the ![]() Of course, there are other alternatives than metaphysical “realism” and Results of action” (or “workability”) rather than in efficacy of representation. Independent reality, but disagrees with the notion of “correspondence,Īgreement, or copying” and, instead, speaks of agreement in terms of “the Pragmatism”-agrees with metaphysical realism that there is an An undiscussed alternative: “ metaphysical General, exist only as objects of thought, as depicted or represented by minds.” “.the view that things of some specified kind, or perhaps, even things in 161 To deny this would be to adhere to metaphysical idealism: Theory presupposes “.that there is an independent reality with which ourīeliefs and statements may correspond or fail to correspond.” According to BonJour, this is the central tenet of 160 Given this characterization, of course, it is clear that the correspondence Theory of the nature of truth is characterized as the view which “.holds thatĪ belief or statement is true if it corresponds to or agrees with the Nature of truth (rather than a coherence theory of its nature). He wishes to defend the traditional, common-sensical view which he willĬall metaphysical realism which is centered upon a correspondence theory of the Truth with long-run coherence would have a ready answer to the “problem” here! This is not the sort of view which BonJour wishes to champion. Truth, that adhering to those standards is That an inquirer who accepts beliefs which are justified according to thatĪccount (and rejects ones which are not) is thereby at least likely to arrive at Justification, is to provide an argument or rationale of some sort for thinking In addition to providing an account of the standards of epistemological Bonjour’s The Structure of Empirical Knowledge Chapter 8Ĭoherence and Truth Ĭhapter 1, an essential part of the task of an adequate epistemological theory,
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